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Abstract 
Associative recognition memory and context effects are two lines of research that 
exist in parallel with little cross talk. Associative recognition tasks ask participants to 
distinguish the studied associations oftwo or more items from novel or rearranged 
associations (e.g., Cohn & Moscovitch, 2007; Craik & Schloerscheidt, 2011), whereas 
context effect studies have shown that the recognition ofan individual object is enhanced 
when presented in its original context (e.g., Hollingworth, 2006; Hayes, Nadel, & Ryan, 
2007). Our study investigated whether familiarity or recollection supports both 
associative recognition and context effects through the use ofa speeded recognition test. 
In two experiments, a response deadline did not change the size ofthe context 
effect or reduce discrimination ofold and rearranged items, indicating that both tasks 
might rely on familiarity. This occurred both when participants had to engage in 
associative recognition as it is traditionally studied (discriminating old and rearranged 
pairings) and when the task asked to discriminate familiar and novel objects and 
backgrounds. In both studies, a reliable context effect was observed. The results suggest 
that context effects for object recognition rely on familiarity, which indicates that object 
and background might be encoded as one coherent representation, not as individual 
entities (Hayes, Nadel, & Ryan, 2007; Levy, Rabinyan, &Vakil, 2008). 
V1 
Introduction 
The ability to form and retrieve associative information between two or more 
items is fundamental in the construction ofcomplex memory representations. For 
example, we associate people's faces and their names after our first time meeting them, in 
order to address them correctly in subsequent encounters. One of the ways to assess the 
ability to retrieve a previously encountered association is by testing associative 
recognition memory. Associative recognition memory is defined as distinguishing the 
studied association of two or more items from novel associations. This task requires 
remembering the specific pairing of two items (associative memory) in addition to 
remembering the individual items (item memory). In the previous example, we need to 
remember the person's face and the name individually (item memory) in addition to 
remembering the association between the two (associative memory). These associations 
are established by memory binding, a process in which multiple items become bound to 
one another at encoding (Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1997). 
Memory binding provides a mechanism that allows for the relations among 
different stimuli to be encoded. Binding an item to its contextual details improves the 
ability to retrieve accurate memory sources to later use in retrieval. Impairment in 
memory binding leads to disturbances in episodic memory, indicating that this process is 
the foundation for the development ofepisodic memory. Thus, successful associative 
recognition memory often relies on memory binding at encoding (Sluzenski, Newcombe, 
& Kovacs, 2006). 
According to Newcombe, Lloyd, & Balcomb (2011), there are two distinct types 
ofbinding that support episodic memory: intraobject and interobject binding. Inraobject 
I 
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refers to the association ofvarious features ofan object such as shape and color; whereas 
interobject binding refers to the association between an object and its context such as an 
environmental setting or a surrounding background. Ecker, Zimmer, and Groh-Bordin 
(2007) suggested that interobject binding (Le., object-context binding) might be more 
relevant to episodic memory, and therefore, will be the focus of the current research. 
Previous research has indicated that binding does not only fulfill the demand for 
remembering the associative information, but also facilitates memory for individual items 
(e.g., Craik & Schloerscheidt, 2011; Hayes et aI., 2007). The role ofbinding in item 
memory is evident in the phenomenon referred to as the context effect. The context effect 
is defined as an increase in memory performance for items that are tested in their original 
contexts compared to those tested in different contexts (Humphreys, 1976; for a review, 
see Smith & Vela, 2001). Among early research in context effects are studies conducted 
I 
r 
by Light and Carter-Sobell (1970). They examined the context effect by comparing word 
recognition when a word was tested in its original context (the same context as study 
phase) to when it is presented in a new context, or in no context at all. For example, the ! 
word "jam" was paired with "strawberry" at study phase. At test, the participants were I 
asked to recognize the word "jam" when presented in its original context "strawberry 
jam," in another context "traffic jam" (Experiment 1), or by itself (Experiment 2). Their 
findings demonstrated that word recognition was highest when presented with its studied 
paired word, followed by new context items (e.g., ''traffic-jam''), followed by single word 
items. The finding of superior recognition for words tested on the studied context Ipresumably reflects a binding mechanism that occurred during encoding. 
I 
\ 
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More recently, Markopolous and colleagues (2010) studied the context effect 
using word-background associations. At study, a list ofwords was presented on various 
background colors. At test, the words were presented either on the same background as 
studied, or on a different background. In this study, the context was defined as the 
background colors. The results indicated a context effect in word recognition - the 
perfonnance was highest for items that were tested on the same background in which 
they were studied. These findings indicated that the reinstatement ofthe studied 
background facilitated word recognition at test, thus implying that word and background 
might have been bound together at encoding. 
Although there is a large body ofresearch supporting the idea ofthat context 
facilitates word recognition (e.g., Craik & Schloerscheidt, 2011; Humphreys, 1976; Light 
& Carter-Sobell, 1980), fewer studies have examined the context effect in object 
recognition (e.g., Craik & Schloerscheidt, 2011; Hayes et at, 2007; Levy, Rabinyan, 
&Vakil, 2008; Nakashima & Yokosawa, 2011). For research in context effects using 
object-background association, the tenns "context" and "background" are used 
interchangeably, both referring to the background surrounding the objects. Most ofthe 
studies on context effects using object-background association employ a paradigm in 
which the context manipulation is based on the constancy or change of the background at 
study and at test. Performance in object recognition is compared between the old pairing 
items (i.e., object tested on the same background as study), rearranged items (Le., object 
tested on another studied background that was not paired together with the object at 
study), new-background items (i.e., object tested on a novel background), and no 
background items (i.e., object tested on a white background) (see Figure 1). 
3 
At Study 
Attest 
Old Rearranged New-background punoJ3'l:luq oN 
Figure 1. These stimuli are examples of a paradigm for studying associative 
recognition and context effects using objects and natural backgrounds. 
Hayes et al. (2007) examined the context effects using images of objects 
embedded in natural scenes (e.g. a teapot on a wooden table) using a paradigm similar to 
that ofFigure 1. The goal of their study was to compare object recognition between items 
that were tested on the same background and those tested on a different background. 
There were four types oftest items: two "same context" conditions and two "shifted 
context" conditions. The "same context" conditions consisted of the "Scene. Scene" items 
(the objects were studied on a natural background and tested on the same background) 
and the "Object.Object" condition (the objects were studied on a white background and 
tested on a white background). The "shifted context" conditions consisted of the 
I 
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"Scene. Object" items (object were studied on a natural background and tested on a white 
background) and the "Object.Scene" items (objects were studied on a white background I 
I 

I
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and tested on a natural background). Their findings demonstrated context effects; that is, 

object recognition performance was significantly higher for the "same context" 

conditions compared to the "shifted context" conditions. The results of this and other 

studies on context effects using naturalistic object-background association as stimuli have 

demonstrated a increase recognition performance by as much as 15% in the old pairing 

items compared to new pairing items. 

A theoretically relevant question regarding the nature of associative memory is 
whether memory binding is an automatic or effortful process. In other words, does the 
binding between an item and its background occur explicitly? This question has been 
addressed in studies that manipulate different encoding instruction. Hayes et al. (2009) 
studied context effects using face-background associations. In this study, participants 
were instructed to rate friendliness of face images. Face images were embedded on either 
unique backgrounds (e.g., in front ofa building, in a restaurant) or black backgrounds. 
The results showed that faces were better recognized when tested on the same 
background in which they were studied. Although the encoding instruction only 
demanded the processing of faces, context effects for face recognition implied that the 
face-background association occurred automatically. Similar to this finding, Hayes et at. 
(2007) studied the automaticity ofobject-background binding by manipulating the 
encoding instructions. For the "incidental" condition, participants were instructed to 
judge the price of the objects: "Does this object cost more than $25?" In the "intentional" 
condition, participants were told to remember the objects for a later memory test. Context 
effects were observed in both conditions. Importantly, the sizes of the context effects 
J
were similar for both groups, reflecting that object-background binding might occur r 
, 
i 
; 
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automatically. Hayes and colleagues (2009) speculated that automaticity in memory 
binding might occur because we cannot always predict how useful or important certain 
information might become in the future. 
Other methods have been employed to examine whether binding is always an 
explicit and conscious process. In Levy, Rabinyan, and Vakil's (2008) study, objects and 
context pictures (Le., a picture of a scene background) were presented simultaneously 
side by side on a screen. At test, participants were asked to recognize the objects and the 
specific position of the context pictures. The results showed that the presence of the 
context pictures facilitated recognition for the objects; however, explicit information 
regarding the context picture (Le., the studied position) was not remembered. Thus, 
context effects occurred even when the contextual information is not directly recognized, 
suggesting that context effects might not require explicit memory for contextual 
information. 
On the other hand, Nakashima and Y okosawa (2011) have argued that object-
background binding requires explicit encoding instructions. In their study, participants 
viewed rich background scenes, each consisted of fifteen objects. The results revealed 
that object-background binding only occurred for tasks in which the contextual 
information was required (e.g., intentional memory task), but not for those in which 
contextual information was not required (e.g., object change detection task). Based on 
this finding, the authors suggested that object-background binding does not always occur 
automatically. I 

I 
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The literature suggests the involvement of two associative mechanisms 
underlying the context effect: (1) the object and background are fused into a single 
representation, and (2) the representations ofobject and background are arbitrarily 
associated (Hayes et al., 2007). This theoretical perspective is built upon the dual 
processing theory by Mandler (1980) - a dominant theory that has been supported by 
many different lines of research in recognition memory (for a review, see Y onelinas, 
2002). According to this theory, recognition memory relies on two processes: familiarity 
and recollection. Familiarity refers to a subjective feeling ofhaving encountered an item Ibefore without retrieval of any specific details about the encoding episode. Recollection 
! 
I 
refers to the ability to retrieve specific details associated with the experience during 
encoding. Recollection-based retrieval is therefore an effortful process, which takes 
longer than familiarity. For example, it takes a brief moment to recognize a familiar 
teapot; however, it frequently takes a longer to recollect when and where the teapot was 
previously encountered in the past (e.g. the teapot was on top ofa wooden table and next 
to a lamp). In this example, the initial recognition relies on familiarity and the retrieval of 
context relies on recollection. A large body of research, using the dual-process models, 
has suggested that item recognition is supported by familiarity, whereas associative 
recognition relies on recollection (e.g., Hockley & Consoli, 1999; Rotello & Heit, 2000; 
Yonelinas, 1997,2002). 
Although researchers have considered associative recognition to be supported 
recollection (Speer & Curran, 2007; for review, see Y onelinas, 2002), some studies have 
shown that familiarity can support associative recognition in events where two items are 
"unitized" at encoding (Hayes-Roth, 1977; Kelly & Wixted, 2001). Unitization is defined 
7 \ [ 

,f 
as a process in which two or more items are "fused" together and encoded as one 
coherent representation (Oraf & Schacter, 1989). Yonelinas et al. (1999) demonstrated 
evidence for the role of familiarity in unitized association in studies examining 
discrimination abilities for studied faces and rearranged faces (Le., rearranged features of 
hair, eyes, nose). This finding suggested that the association of eyes, nose and mouth are I 
t 
i 
encoded as one single representation (face). Other studies using word pairs have t 
employed encoding manipulation to induce unitization at encoding (e.g., Quamme, I 
tYonelinas & Norman, 2007) and demonstrated that a unitized association could be i 
fsupported by familiarity. t 
f, 
The notion ofunitization is important in this literature ofcontext effects. As f I 
IHayes et al. (2007) mentioned, objects and backgrounds might be integrated and encoded I 
as a single representation (i.e., unitization), or encoded individually and linked together Ithrough an arbitrary association (i.e., binding). If the object and the background are, in I 
I 
.. 
fact, unitized during encoding, then recognition for object-background association can be 
supported by familiarity. 
There is discrepancy in previous studies examining whether familiarity or 
recollection supports the context effect. The studies by Hayes et al. (2007) using an 
encoding instruction manipulation demonstrated automaticity of the object-background 
binding, which implies that this process might rely on familiarity. This argument is I 
especially supported by two main findings. In all experiments, the participants were told 
to pay attention to the objects only. A reliable context effect observed across all 
experiments showed that the binding ofobject and background might have occurred even 
when the associative information is not demanded at encoding or at retrieval. Secondly, 
8 I 
in Experiment 2, the "object.object" items (objects were studied on a white background 
and tested on a white background) also yielded higher recognition compared to the 
shifted background conditions. This finding showed that object-background binding 
occurs regardless ofwhether the background is rich or sparse. Although Hayes and 
colleagues (2007) did not explore the implications of this finding in a framework ofdual-
process theory, this result indirectly addresses the question ofwhether recollection or 
familiarity supports context effect in object recognition. The observed context effects 
suggested that the correct recognition for the "object.object" items is supported by 
familiarity. At study, all objects were studied on a white background; therefore, the 
retrieval of the objects may not rely on recollection due to absence ofcontextual 
information of the background to be recollected to support recognition. This finding 
provided evidence that recollection failed to account for changes in levels of correct 
object recognition. The context effects in object recognition might have primarily worked 
via the assessment of the objects' familiarity. 
In addition to behavioral findings, many studies have investigated the neural 
correlates for memory binding and context effects in associative recognition memory. It 
is well established that the Medial Temporal Lobes (MTL) subregions are important for 
memory binding. Different subregions might mediate different aspects ofa visual 
stimulus (Ranganath, 2010). The perirhinal cortex (PRc) is associated with processing 
specific information about objects' physical properties. The parahippcampal cortex (PHc) 
is associated with processing the contextual information such as ''when'' and ''where'' 
components of the visual experience (e.g. Davachi, 2006; Hayes et al., 2007, 2009; 
Howard et aI., 2011). The outputs of the PRc and the PHc are received by the entorhinal 
f 
9 \ 
cortex and subsequently become integrated in the hippocampus (for review, see 
Eichenbaum, Yonelinas & Ranganath, 2007). 
Researchers have also explored the neural correlates of the context effects. Hayes 
et al. (2009) aimed to identify the brain regions associated with viewing faces when 
contextual infonnation was present at encoding, as well as at successful subsequent 
retrieval, using fMRl At study, participants were presented with a series face images 
embedded either on natural backgrounds (FS-F) or on black backgrounds (F-F). 
Participants were instructed to rate the levels of friendliness of the person in the picture. 
At test, participants were asked to discriminate faces on black backgrounds as "old" or 
''new.'' There were three main findings. First, there was a higher activation in the 
hippocampus for successful recognition trials (hit> miss) for the FS-F compared to the 
F-F conditions. This indicated that binding between face and background was mediated 
by the hippocampus. Second, there was greater PHc activation in the FS-F than in the F-F 
condition, indicating reactivation of the background at test. Similar findings were 
reported in Experiment 4 of Hayes et al. (2007), which demonstrated that PHc may be 
tresponsible for reinstatement the original context when being objects were tested on the 
"context shift" conditions. These results are consistent with previous research suggesting Ithat the PHc mediates scene processing (Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998). Third, there was a i 
hemispheric asymmetry in medial temporal lobe activation at encoding, with the left PHc I 
I 
J 
activation correlated with smaller context effects, whereas the right correlated with larger 

context effects. ( 

Other studies in recognition memory have also examined the neural correlates for 
familiarity- and recollection-based memory responses. Findings from previous research 
10 
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have shown that the activation in the PRc is associated with familiarity, whereas those in 
the hippocampus and the PHc are associated with recollection (e.g., Kirwan & Stark, 
2004; Ranganath, 2004). In cases in which unitization occurs, Haskins and colleagues 
(2008) found that word pair unitization is correlated with PRc's activation during study 
and test. This fmding is consistent with results from studies showing that damage in the 
hippocampus does not impair unitized associations (Ranganath, 2010). 
Despite their common underlying process ofmemory binding, associative 
memory and context effects have been investigated together in one paradigm by only a 
few studies. Cohn and Moscovitch (2007) studied associative recognition and context 
effects by comparing two different task demands at retrieval: associative identification 
and associative reinstatement tasks. In their experiments, the participants studied a list of 
unrelated word pairs (e.g., shirt-chair; book-jar). At test, the associative identification 
task requires the participant to distinguish the old pairing (e.g., shirt-chair) from novel 
pairings (rearranged pair: shirt-jar and half-items: shirt-beef). Associative identification is 
an associative recognition task that requires explicit retrieval of the association between 
two words in addition to remembering the individual words. The rearranged pairs (e.g., 
shirt-jar) are made up of both old items, but the association is novel. Based on the dual-
process theory, the ability to recognize old association requires recollection, whereas the 
ability to recognize an old item only requires familiarity. Therefore, in this task, 
participants have to rely on recollection to recognize the old pairs and correctly reject the 
rearranged pairs. 
In the associative reinstatement task, participants were asked to recognize whether , 

both words are old, regardless of their previous pairing. The retrieval of the associative 
11 
infonnation is not required in this task because the correct "old" responses would also 
apply in both the old and the rearranged pairs. The authors noted that this task is 
essentially an item recognition task because the retrieval of the association is not 
required. Perfonnance on the associative reinstatement task, however, demonstrates the 
context effects in item recognition. That is, the paired counterpart item is present in the 
old pairs, but not in the rearranged pairs. Thus, higher recognition for old pairs compared 
to rearranged pairs would indicate that the reinstatement of the paired items facilitates 
word recognition, regardless of whether the retrieval of the association is demanded. In 
other words, higher recognition for old pairs compared to rearranged pairs in the 
associative reinstatement task would indicate context effects in word recognition. 
Cohn and Moscovitch (2007) aimed to better understand the binding process of 
word pairs at the retrieval level. They used the response deadline method, which requires 
the participants in the "speeded" condition to respond in less than 100Oms, while those in 
the "non-speeded" condition to respond after 1000ms has passed. The length of the 
response deadline is based on previous findings suggesting a duration window of 
familiarity to be under 100Oms. It has been suggested that recognition that takes longer 
than 1000ms is supported by some degree of recollection. Therefore, a response deadline 
of 1000ms should negatively affect recollection-based recognition such as associative 
identification, but not familiarity-based recognition such as item recognition (for a 
review, see Yonelinas, 2002). This methodology investigated the nature of the associative 
recognition as well as context effects, and allows the comparison of accuracy 
perfonnance for different task demands at retrieval. 
I 
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One way Cohn and Moscovitch (2007) assessed accuracy performance was by. 
computing the discrimination rating (hit rate for old pairs - false alarm rate for rearranged 
pairs). When a task requires recollection, speed should impede participants' ability to 
recognize old pairs and correctly rejecting rearranged pairs. For the associative 
identification task, Cohn and Moscovitch (2007) found discrimination rates of .09 and .57 
for the speeded and non-speeded groups, respectively. For the associative reinstatement 
task, they found discrimination rates of .10 and .11 in the speeded and non-speeded 
groups, respectively. The results revealed that speed impaired the accuracy performance 
in the associative identification task, but not in the associative reinstatement task. This 
indicates that the associative identification task involves recollection, whereas the 
associative reinstatement task appears to be similar to an item recognition task, which 
does not necessitate recollection. Importantly, context effects were demonstrated in the 
associative reinstatement task, reflected by an increase in recognition for "old" compared 
to "rearranged" word pairs. This shows that the presence of the pair-word facilitates word 
recognition, in the absence of the demand for the retrieval of associative information. 
Few studies have combined the two lines of research in associative recognition 
memory and context effects together in one paradigm. Therefore, Cohn and Moscovitch's 
(2007) studies were important because they (1) demonstrated context effects in word 
recognition in the associative reinstatement task; (2) compared the two types of task 
demands (item recognition and associative recognition) simultaneously, and (3) used 
speed to dissociate the contribution of familiarity and recollection on different 
recognition tasks. However, because the study used word pairs, it is not certain that the 
results will apply to objects in natural scene. 
13 
Craik and Schloerscheidt (2011) examined the involvement of familiarity and 
recollection in word-background association as well as object-background associations. 
Their studies focused on the effect ofaging on context effects in item and associative 
recognition. Previous research has suggested that older adults exhibit poor binding 
abilities (Castel & Craik, 2003, Naveh-Benjamin, 2000), as well as higher reliance on 
familiarity, compared to younger adults (Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996, Jennings & Jacoby, 
2003). Craik and Schloerscheidt reasoned that ifbinding between the item and the 
background could not occur at encoding, word/object recognition would not depend on 
the consistency or change ofthe studied context. Given this rationale, they hypothesized 
that context effect would be less prominent in older adults compared to younger adults 
due to their reduced ability ofbinding. 
In experiment I a, words were shown against a city and landscape backgrounds. In 
experiment 1 b, pictures of the common objects superimposed on city and landscape 
backgrounds were studied after participants were instructed to make a connection 
between the object and its background at study. At test, the items (words in experiment 
Ia, and objects in experiment Ib) were tested on an old, a rearranged, a new, or no 
background. The participants were asked to recognize the items as old or new regardless 
of the status of the background. The results revealed that recognition performance was 
highest for the old items, followed by the rearranged, the new-background, and the no-
background items in both age groups. The magnitudes of the context effects were similar 
for words and objects (a decrease of 12% in hit rate between old and rearranged items). 
Importantly, in contrast to what they had expected, old adults benefitted from context 
effect to a similar extent as younger adults, despite their declined abilities to rely on 
14 
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recollection. These findings imply that the context effect might only require the 
involvement of familiarity and not recollection. 
In Experiment 2, the participants performed an associative identification task 
(object-background associative recognition) by recognizing whether the object-
background pairing was old or new (rearranged or old object - new background items). In 
one fourth of the trials, the participants were presented with the object on no background 
and asked to recall the background that was associated with that object. The results 
showed that for the recognition test, older adults performed more poorly than younger 
adults in discriminating old pairings from new pairings. Specifically, older adults had 
higher false alarm rate (Le. incorrect "yes" responses) for the rearranged items than that 
of the new-backgrounds items. This finding is consistent with previous research 
indicating that older adults have a deficit for recollection, which decreased their ability to 
correctly reject novel associations that made up ofold items. For the recall test, older 
adults performed much worse compared to younger adults. Recall memory is primarily 
driven by recollection; thus, this finding also agrees with the notion that older adults 
exhibit recollection deficit. Together, the results from Experiment 2 are consistent with 
the idea that older adults rely more heavily on familiarity than recollection to 
discriminate old from new items. I 
There are two ways in which Craik and Schloerscheidt's (2011) findings i 
contribute to the understanding of the context effect as well as associative recognition I 
memory. First, context effects were illustrated to the same extent in both age groups. I 
Second, the object-background associative recognition task is similar to Cohn and ! t 
,!Moscovitch's description ofassociative identification task in which the nature of the task 
t 
1. 
, 
15 \ 
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i 
demands strategic retrieval of the associations between two items. Together, both studies 
found that the associative identification task requires recollection-based recognition. On 
the other hand, item recognition can rely primarily on familiarity, shown in the 
enhancement ofobject recognition in the presence of the studied context for older adults 
regardless of the declined abilities to use recollection. 
Current study 
Previous research has indicated that memory binding supports not only I 
recognition memory for associative information, but also the context effects that I 
facilitates memory for item information (Cohn & Moscovitch, 2007; Craik & 
Schloerscheidt, 2011; Sluzenski et aI., 2006). However, few studies have focused on how 
the two lines ofresearch meet to answer different aspects of the same question. Adding 
another layer of complexity when examining the contribution of familiarity and 
recollection to context effect is the fact that some studies used verbal stimuli, while 
others used object-background stimuli. Although both lines of research fall under the 
umbrella of the associative recognition memory, one cannot be sure that (l) the binding 
of word pair would be the same as object-background association, and (2) the context 
effects observed in one type of stimuli would have the same effect on another type of 
stimuli. Little attention has been paid to verifying whether object-background associative 
recognition should be conceptualized similarly to word pair associations. Ifnot, what 
might the differences be in the associations between multiple verbal stimuli, and those 
between objects and backgrounds? These are empirical questions that need to be 
addressed in order for different research to collectively understand the role ofcontext in 
recognition memory as one comprehensive picture. 
16 
The main goal of the current study is to examine the context effects in associative 
recognition tasks as well as item recognition tasks. In addition to using a context 
manipulation, we also investigated the effect of task demands at retrieval on context 
effects. Our primary research question concerned whether familiarity or recollection 
support the three types of tasks: the associative identification task, the associative 
reinstatement task, and the object recognition task. In two experiments, we combined the 
paradigms employed by Craik and Schloerscheidt (2011), and Cohn and Moscovitch 
(2007). 
The robust context effects found in Hayes et al.'s study (2007) might be due to the 
fact that they used objects embedded on natural backgrounds, as opposed to other 
research that uses arbitrary backgrounds (e.g., Craik & Schloerscheidt, 2011; Lloyd, 
Doydum, & Newcombe, 2009; Sluzenski, Newcombe, & Kovacs, 2006). Craik and 
Schloerscheidt' stimuli (2011) used common objects superimposed on city and landscape I 
scenes. The associability between the objects and backgrounds in these two experiments I 
might differ immensely; and thus, could be a critical factor in the way object and I 
Ibackground are bound at encoding. Similar to Hayes et al. (2007), our interest focused on 
f 
the naturalistic association between objects and natural backgrounds (e.g., a teapot on a I 
f 
wooden table), with the intention to mimic our frequent encounters with objects in our l t 
environment. IThe way in which context effects facilitate item recognition at retrieval has 
remained unclear. The dual-process theory indicates two independent processes that I 
i 
t 
comprise recognition memory: familiarity and recollection. Many different methods have 
been employed to answer the question as to which process - familiarity or recollection- r f 
I
17 

contributes to the context effect ofobject recognition. Some ofthese methods include the 
t 
I 

I 

I 
I 
"RememberlKnow" paradigm (e.g., Macken, 2002), confidence rating paradigm (e.g., 
Humphreys, 1976) as well as age group comparisons (Castel & Craik, 2003; Craik and 
" (
Schloerscheidt, 2011). One ofthe limitations ofboth the "rememberlknow" and the 
confidence rating paradigms is that they rely on subjective reports (for a review, see 
Y onelinas, 2002). The current studies employed the response deadline method to 
dissociate the contribution of the two measures ofrecognition. Similar to Cohn and ! 
Moscovitch's (2007) study, this method assumes that the speeded responses «1000ms) Ii 
fshould primarily on familiarity, whereas the non-speeded responses should rely on 
recollection (for a review, see Yonelinas, 2002). There is a debate in some previous Iresearch on whether or not object-background binding is automatic (Hayes et al., 2007; 
I 
tLevy et aI., 2008) or effortful (Nakashima & Y okosawa, 2011) at encoding. 
Using the response deadline method would provide an additional measure as to 
which process accounts for the retrieval ofdifferent recognition task demands. If speed ,
negatively impairs recognition performance, it suggests that the task relies on 
recollection. However, if the recognition performances are similar between the speed and I 
non-speeded groups, it suggests that the task relies primarily on familiarity. 
To summarize, the present research aims to contribute to the existing literature in 
the following ways: 
l 

I 

(1) Previous research has mainly focused on instruction manipulations at encoding, 
whereas few studies have used test instruction manipulation to examine to effect oftask 
demand at retrieval on context effects. (2) Previous research has mainly employed the 
RememberlKnow (e.g., Macken, 2002) and confidence rating paradigms (e.g., Tulving & 
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Thompson, 1971) to dissociate the contribution of familiarity and recollection in the 
context effect. Not many studies have used response deadline method to determine the 
contribution ofthese processes (Cohn & Moscovitch, 2007). (3) To date, no study of 
which we are aware has compared performance on item and associative recognition tasks 
simultaneously to study object-background association. The closest is work by Cohn and 
Moscovitch (2007) using word pair association and response deadline manipulation to 
study item and associative recognition tasks at retrieval. 
~ 
I 
I 
( 
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Experiment 1 
Method 
We examined the effect ofspeed on two different recognition tasks, the 
associative identification task and an object recognition task. Based on the dual-process 
theory, the object-background associative task requires recollection; whereas the object 
recognition, an item recognition task, would rely on familiarity (Craik & Schloerscheidt, 
2011; Levy et al., 2008). From this standpoint, speed should have a negative impact on 
the object-background associative task, but not the object recognition task. The main goal 
of this experiment is to investigate whether familiarity or recollection supports the two 
different recognition tasks at retrieval. 
Consistent with previous research (Cohn and Moscovitch, 2007, Jones & Jacoby, 
2001; Light et al., 2004), we expected that the speeded group would perform more poorly 
compared to the non-speeded group, in the associative identification task, but not the 
object recognition task (but see Macken, 2002; Nakashima & Yokosawa, 2011). For the 
associative identification task, we expected the hit rate to be higher and the false alarm 
rates to be lower for the non-speeded group compared to the speeded group because the 
contribution ofrecollection would allow participants to recognize old pairings and I
correctly reject novel ones. We also hypothesized that there will be a context effect in 
object recognition: the "old" items would yield that highest recognition, followed by the I 
rearranged and the new-background items as is reported in Hayes et at. 's (2007) study. I 
I 
Participants I 
tFifty-eight Seton Hall University students participated in the study for course t 
credit.. All students received credit, however, one participant's data were removed from I 
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the analysis due to programming error. Each participant was tested individually on a 
computer or in a room with another participant. In instances where two participants were 
tested in the same room, a large board separated the two computers so that the 
participants could not see each other's computer screen. Twenty-eight and twenty-nine 
participants were in the speeded and non-speeded groups, respectively 
Materials and Apparatus 
A total of 120 pictures were used in this study. Some of the pictures were taken 
from Hayes et al.'s (2007) study. Others were taken from Internet image searches in order 
to have enough stimuli. All stimuli were manipulated using Adobe Photoshop CS5. The 
experiment was programmed using E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, 
PA). 
Design 
I 

recognition) mixed design. Response deadline was manipulated between-participants, and 
the other variables were manipulated within-participants. The dependent variable was the 
proportion of "yes" responses. 
Procedures ~ 
This experiment consisted of two phases: a study phase and test phase. At study, I 
\ 

The experimental design was a 4 (status: old, rearranged, new-background, new) 
x 2 (response deadline: speeded, non-speeded) x 2 (task: associative identification, object 
80 pictures plus 10 buffer pictures were presented serially 3000ms each with a 1500ms 
lSI, similar to the timing used in Hayes et al.'s (2007) study. Encoding instructions were 
given as follows "Remember the objects and the backgrounds for an upcoming memory 
test. " 
21 
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The test phase immediately followed the study phase. At the beginning of the test 
phase, participants were infooned that there were two types ofquestions. For the "object 
+background?" question (Le., the associative identification task), the participants were 
instructed to respond "yes" if they saw the object and the background previously paired 
together. For the "object?" question (Le., the object recognition task), the participants 
were instructed to respond "yes" if they saw the object, regardless of the background. The 
participants were instructed to respond by pressing labeled keys "yes" and "no", which 
corresponded to keys j and f on the keyboard, respectively. A practice phase, consisting 
of5 associative identification task trials and 5 object recognition task trials given in a 
randomized order, was given after the test instruction. During the practice and 
recognition tests, two types of tasks were given in a randomized order. The test phase 
consisted of 80 items: 20 old, 20 rearranged, 20 new-background, and 20 new items, 
given in a randomized order. Out of 80 total trials, 40 associative identification and 40 
object recognition task trials were given in a randomized order. The questions ("object + 
background?" or "object?") were presented on the screen for 150Oms, followed by the 
picture. The participants in the speeded condition were instructed to respond in less than 
1000ms after the onset of the picture presentation, and that a red screen with the words 
"Speed up" would appear after 1000ms has passed. Only the responses made within the 
window of 0 - 1000ms were recorded. For the non-speeded condition, the pictures were 
presented on the screen for 1000ms at test, followed by a blank screen. The participants 
could only respond after the 1000ms had passed. Two sets ofpictures were used to 
counterbalance pictures between participants. Each picture in the two lists was 
counterbalanced so that each picture was viewed in any of the item statuses an equal 
22 
I 
number of items across participants. The presentation orders ofpictures were randomized 
for each participant at study and test phase. I 
J 
I 
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Results f 
The proportion of"yes" responses was the dependent variable. In the I 
associative identification task, the proportion of"yes" responses for the old items was I 
the hit rate; whereas the proportion of, 'yes" responses for the rearranged, new-
background and the new items was the false alarm rate (see table 1). In the object 
recognition task, the proportion of "yes" responses for the old, rearranged, new-
background items were the hit rates; whereas the proportion of ''yes'' responses for 
the new items are the false alarm rate. The proportion ofresponses that were made 
before the 1000ms deadline in the speeded group was .92. The significance level for 
initial analysis, post-hoc and planned comparisons were set at .OS. In events of 
problems with sphericity, the Greenhouse-Geisser values were used. Means as a 
function of item status and response deadline are summarized in Table 2. 
Table 1. Correct response for each condition in three recognition tasks in Experiment 1 
Test Instruction Rearran round NewOld 
Associative NoYes No 
Identification task 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Table 2. Mean proportion of 'yes" responses for four item conditions in the associative i 
'" identification task and the object recognition task for Experiment 1. Standard deviations f 
f
are reported in parentheses. l 
Associative Identification Task 
I

i 
Object Recognition Task 
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Comparisons between Associative Identification and 0 bject Recognition 
Performance 
We analyzed the effect of response deadline across both the associative 
identification and the object recognition tasks by conducting a 2(status: old, new) x 2 
(task: associative identification, object recognition) x 2 (response deadline: speeded, non-
speeded) mixed factor ANOV A. This analysis only considered variables for which the 
same answer was correct for both tasks. An omnibus ANOV A measure would not be 
appropriate for this analysis using all four levels of status. Therefore, only the old and the 
new item statuses were analyzed because the correct answers for these items are the same 
for both tasks (Le. the proportion of "yes" responses was the hit rate for the old items, and 
the false alarm rate for the new items). There was a main effect of status [F(l, 55)= 
11.34, p< .05, ,,2 = .17 ]. Overall, the hit rate for old items (M= .62, SE= .03) were higher 
than false alarm rate for new items (M= .27, SE= 03). There was a main effect of task 
[F(l, 55)= 122.33,p< .001, ,,2= .70]. Overall, participants were more likely to respond 
"yes" in the object recognition task (M= .47, SD= .02) than in the associative 
identification task (M= .42, SD= .02). There was no main effect of response deadline 
[F(l, 55)= 2.67,p= .11, ,,2= .05]. Overall, the speeded (M= .41, SE= .03) and the non-
speeded groups (M=. 48, SE= .03) performed similarly. There was no significant 
interaction between status and response deadline [F(l, 55)= 1.13,p= .26, ,,2= .02]. The 
effect of response deadline on the hit and the false alarm rates were similar for the old 
and new items. There was no significant interaction between task and status [F(l, 55)< 1, 
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p= .69, '12= .00]. Participants' hit and false alann rates were similar between the 
associative identification and the object recognition tasks. There was no significant l 
interaction between task and response deadline [F(l, 55)= 1.31,p= .26, '12= .02]. The I 
f 
effect of response deadline on the overall performance was similar between the !Ie 
I 
I 
! 
associative identification and the object recognition tasks. The three-way interaction of 

status, task, and response deadline was not significant [F(l, 55)< 1, p= .90, '12 = .00]. ~ 

The effect of response deadline on the associative identification task 
The next set of analyses focused on each recognition memory task individually. 
The results for the Associative Identification Task are displayed in Figure 2. 
1 Associative Identification 
0.8 
• Speeded (n=28) 
• Nonspeeded (n=29) 0.6Proportion of 
"Yes" proportion 
0.4 
0.2 

0 

Old Rearranged New-background New 
Figure 2. The mean proportion of "yes" responses for the four item types in 
the Associative Identification Task of Experiment 1. The dotted ban 
represent false alarms and the error bars reflect standard error. 
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We conducted a 4 (status: old, rearranged, new-background, new) x 2(response 
deadline: speeded, non-speeded) repeated measures ANOVA on the "yes" responses to 
associative identification trials. There was a main effect of status [F(3, 55)= 31.01, p< 
.001,112 = .36]. Overall, participants responded differently across the four item statuses. 
There was a main effect of response deadline [F(l, 55)= 4.50,p< .05,112 = .08]. Overall, 
participants were more likely to respond "yes" in the non-speeded group (M= .47, SE= 
.03) than in the speeded group (M= .38, SE= .03). There was no significant interaction 
between status and response deadline [F(3, 55)= .35,p= .79, 112 = .01]. The effect of 
response deadline was similar across the four types of test items (old, rearranged, new-
background, and new items) 
To further analyze the main effect of status, paired-sample t tests were conducted 
to compare the hit and false alarm rates across four item statuses. The results revealed 
that the hit rate for old items (M= .59, SE= .03) was significantly higher than the false 
alarm rates for the rearranged items (M= .43, SE= .03), [t(56)= 3.99,p< .001], and the 
new-background items (M= .42, SE= .03), [t(56)= 4.63,p< .001]. There was no 
significant difference in the false alarm rates between the rearranged items and the new-
background items [t(56)= .38,p= .70]. On average, the false alarm rate for the new items 
(M= .25, SE= .03) was significantly lower compared to the old items [t(56)= 9.25, p< 
.001], the rearranged items [t(56)= 4.90,p< .001], and the new-background items [t(56)= 
6.29,p< .001]. 
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The effect of response deadline on the object recognition task 
The next set ofanalyses focused on each recognition memory task individually. 
The results for the Object Recognition Task are displayed in Figure 3. 
1 
Proportion of 
"Yes" responses 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
0 
Object Recognition 
• Speeded (n=28) 
• Nonspeeded (n=29) 
Old Rearranged New-background New 
Figure 3. The mean proportion of "yes" responses for the four item types in 
the Object Recognition Task of Experiment 1. The dotted bars represent 
false alarms and the error bars reftect standard error. 
We conducted a 4 (status: old, rearranged, new-background, new) x 2 (response 
deadline: speeded, non-speeded) repeated measures ANOVA on the proportion of"yes" 
responses to the context trials. There was a main effect of status [F(3, 55)= 31.34,p< 
.001, 1/2 = .36]. Participants responded differently across four item statuses. There was no 
main effect of response deadline [F(I, 55)= 2.08,p= .16,1/2 = .04]. Overall, the speeded 
(M= .46, SE= .03) and the non-speeded groups (M= .52, SE= .03) performed similarly. 
28 
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There was no interaction between status and response deadline [F(3, 55)= .29,p= .84,1'/2 
= .01]. The effects ofresponse deadline were similar across four item statuses. I 
To interpret the main effect ofstatus, paired-sample t tests were conducted to f 
compare the hit and false alarm rates in the four item statuses. The results revealed that , 
the hit rate was significantly higher for the old items (M= .65, SE= .03) compared to the !rearranged items (M= .53, SE= .03), [t(56)= 3.64,p< .05], and the new-background items 
i 
I, 
(M= .49, SE= .03), [t(56)= 4.16,p< .001], representing the context effect. There was no 
tsignificant difference in hit rates between the rearranged items and the new-background i 
I 
! 
items [t(56)= .97,p= .34]. The false alarm rate for the new items (M= .29, SE= .03) was 
significantly lower than the hit rates for the old items [t(56)= 9.44,p< .001], the 
f 
Irearranged items [t(56)= 6.16, p< .001], and the new-background items [t(56)= 5.27,p< 
t 
.001]. These results parallel those of the Associative Identification task. 
I 
t 
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Discussion i l 
Overall, the results showed that hit and false alarm rates were similar between the 
associative identification and the object recognition tasks. Further the response deadline 
did not have an effect on the accuracy performance ofeither task. In fact, the pattern of 
responses was very similar across the two types oftest questions. 
Associative Identification Task 
Overall, participants were successful at discriminating between old pairings from 
novel pairings, indicated by a significantly higher hit rate for old items than the false 
alarm rates in three other statuses. However, there was no significant difference in false 
alarm rates between the rearranged and the new-background items, suggesting that the 
reinstatement of a familiar background that was paired with another object at study (Le. 
rearranged items) did not elevate false alarm rate compared to presenting the object with 
a novel background. 
The response deadline had an effect on participants' responses, which was driven 
by overall elevation of "yes" responses in the non-speeded compared to the speeded 
group. That is, not only the hit rate for old items was higher, but the false alarm rates for 
the rearranged and new-background items were also increased in the non-speeded 
compared to the speeded group. In a traditional associative recognition paradigm in 
which an associative task requires recollection, higher hit rate and lower false alarm rate 
are observed for the non-speeded group compared to the speeded group (Jones & Jacoby, 
200I; Light et al, 2004). In contrast, we found an overall elevation for both hit and false 
alarm rates in the non-speeded compared to the speeded group. Our results demonstrated 
an absence ofresponse deadline effect on accuracy performance in the associative 
30 
Iidentification task, implying that this task might primarily rely on familiarity. This may 
1reflect an important difference between memory for arbitrary word pairs and that of 
f
objects in natural backgrounds. We will return to this idea in the general discussion. 	 1 
I 
t 
Our findings were inconsistent with those ofCohn and Moscovitch (2007), who 
showed that a response deadline impeded performance in the associative identification f 
task. Their results revealed a robust effect ofresponse deadline on discrimination rates t I 
between the speeded (.09) and the non-speeded (.57) groups using word pair stimuli. 
However, our results indicated that response deadline had no effect on accuracy 
performance in this task. Contrary to our hypothesis, we found evidence for a familiarity- I 
driven process in the associative identification task using object and natural background I
stimuli. ! 
IObject Recognition Task 
1 
We replicated context effects as reported by Hayes et al. (2007): the hit rate was 	 ! 
f 
the highest for the old items, followed by the rearranged and the new-background items. 	 ! 
I 
I 
Consistent with Craik and Schloerscheidt's fmdings (2011), the results suggested that the 
reinstatement of a paired background increased object recognition. Further, the failure to 1 
t 
observe a difference in hit rates between the rearranged and the new-background items 	 l 
t 
indicated that context effects did not result from a reinstatement ofany familiar 
background, but only from the specific background that was paired with object at study. 
This finding was ofparticular interest because it speaks for the nature ofobject-
background binding at encoding. If the object and background were encoded individually 
at study, one would expect that the reinstatement of an unassociated studied background 
might induce familiarity to a greater extent than a novel background would. Therefore, 
f 
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the hit rate for the rearranged items would be higher than that for the new-background 
items. Based the on absence of this difference in hit rates, our results suggested that 
object and background might not be encoded individually, but rather as one coherent 
item. 
Relevant to this' argument is the finding by Craile and Schloerscheidt (20 II ), 
showing that older adults could benefit from context effects to a similar extent as younger 
adults, despite their binding deficits. The observed context effects suggested that object-
background binding must have occurred at encoding to some degree in older adults. The 
question becomes then, how could this binding occur when older adults exhibit poor 
binding abilities? Although the authors did not address this issue directly, their findings 
had an implication regarding the nature ofobject-background binding. The fact that older 
adults' binding deficits did not attenuate context effects indicated that object and 
background might be encoded as one whole entity as opposed to two individual items. 
In support ofour hypothesis, we found that response deadline did not have an 
effect on participants' performance, suggesting that the speeded and non-speeded groups 
performed similarly in this task. Craile and Schloerscheidt (20 II) found that older adults 
could benefit from context effects despite of their poor ability to rely on recollection. 
Together, our fmdings and those by Craile and Schloerscheidt demonstrated that 
participants relied primarily on the assessment ofthe objects' familiarity while 
performing the object recognition task. 
In summary, the results of Experiment I showed that both the associative 
identification and the object recognition task demands might rely on the familiarity, at 
least for objects embedded in natural backgrounds. We continued to investigate the 
32 
 I 
context effects for item recognition in two tasks: associative reinstatement and object 
recognition, in Experiment 2. 
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Experiment 2 
Method 
We examined the effect of response deadline on two different tasks, the 
associative reinstatement and the object recognition task. Findings from Cohn and 
Moscovitch (2007) suggested that the associative reinstatement task is essentially an item 
recognition task because the retrieval for the associative information is not required. In 
these trials, participants are asked to endorse an item as old ifboth the object and 
background were presented at study either together or separately. 
Based on the results of Cohn and Moscovitch (2007), we anticipated that response 
deadline should not have an effect because recollection is not required to reject 
rearranged items as novel associations in the associative reinstatement task. Therefore, 
we hypothesized that response deadline should not have an accuracy effect on either task. 
Similar to experiment 1, we expected to observed context effects in both tasks: 
recognition would be highest for the old, compared to the rearranged and the new-
background items. Research using the dual-process models has shown that the non-
speeded group would be able to rely on recollection to not only endorse old items but also 
correctly reject new items. Therefore, accuracy performance at performing this task 
would be similar between the speeded and the non-speeded groups. 
Participants 
Seventy-seven Seton Hall University students participated in the study for course 
credit. All students received course credit for participation; however, two participants' 
data were not included in the analysis due to programming errors. Each participant was 
tested individually on a computer or in a room with another participant. In instances 
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Iwhere two participants were tested in the same room, a large board separated the two I 
computers so that the participants could not see each other's computer screen. Thirty-five 
and forty participants were in the speeded and non-speeded groups, respectively 
Materials and apparatus 
The materials were identical to those used in Experiment 1. IDesign 
tThe experimental design was a 4 (status: old, rearranged, new-background, new) f 
x 2 (response deadline: speeded, non-speeded) x 2 (task: associative reinstatement, object I 
I 
i 
recognition) mixed-participants design. Response deadline was manipulated between-
participants, and the other variables were manipulated within-participants. The dependent f 
i-
variable was the proportion of"yes" responses. i 
I 
1Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that in Experiment 1, with the exception of the two 
question types given at test phase. For the "object, background?" question (Le. the I 
associative reinstatement task), participants were instructed to respond "yes" if they saw I 
the object and the background, regardless ofwhether they were previously paired 
together. For the "object?" question (Le., the object recognition task), the participant was ! 
instructed to respond "yes" if they saw the object, regardless of the background. The 
response deadline manipulation was identical to that in Experiment 1. 
I 
i 
I 
f 
I 
\
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Results 
The proportion of "yes" responses was the dependent variable. In the 
associative reinstatement task, the proportion of ''yes'' responses for the old and the 
rearranged items was the hit rate; whereas the proportion of"yes" responses for the 
new-background and the new items was the false alarm rate (see Table 3). The i 
proportion of responses that were made before the 1000ms deadline in the speeded I 
group was .93. The significance level for initial analysis, post-hoc and planned ! 
comparisons were set at .05. Means as a function of item status and response deadline I 
i 
fare summarized in Table 4. 
Table 3. Correct response for each condition in three recognition tasks in Experiment 2 
Test Instruction Old Rearran2ed New-bacqround New 
Associative 
Reinstatement task 
Yes I yes No No 
Object Recognition Yes Yes Yes No 
l

! 
t 
Table 4. Mean proportion of 'yes" responses for four item conditions in the 
associative reinstatement and the object recognition taskfor Experiment 2. Standard 
deviations are reported in parentheses. 
I
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~ Comparisons between Associative Reinstatement and Object Recognition 
Performance 
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We analyzed the effect of response deadline across both the associative 
reinstatement and the object recognition tasks by conducting a 3(status: old, rearranged, 
new) x 2 (task: associative reinstatement, object recognition) x 2 (response deadline: 
speeded, non-speeded) ANOVA. Similar to Experiment I, an omnibus ANOVA measure 
would not be appropriate for this analysis using all four levels of status. Therefore, only 
the old, rearranged, and the new item statuses were analyzed because the correct answers 
for these items are the same for both tasks (Le. the proportion of"yes" responses was the 
hit rate for the old items and the false alarm rate for the new items). The results showed 
that there was a main effect of status [F(2, 73)= 105.40,p< .001,,,2 .59]. Overall, the 
proportion of"yes" responses differed for old items (M= .63, SE= .02), rearranged items 
(M= .54, SE= .02), and new items (M= .27, SE= .02). There was a main effect of 
response deadline [F(l, 73)= 7.33,p< 0.05, ,,2 = .09]. Overall, the proportion of"yes" 
responses was higher for the non-speeded (M= .53, SE= .02) than the speeded group (M= 
.45, SE= .02). There was no main effect of task [F(2, 73)< 1,p=.97, ,,2= .59]. Overall, 
participants' rates of"yes" responses were similar in the associative reinstatement (M= 
.48, SD= .02) and the object recognition task (M= .48, SD= .02). There was a significant 
interaction between status and response deadline [F(2, 73)= 5.88,p< 0.05, ,,2= .08]. 
Overall, hit rate for old items was higher for the non-speeded (M= .70, SE= .03) for the 
speeded group (M= .57, SE= .03); the hit rate for the rearranged items were higher in the 
non-speeded (M= .61, SE= .03) than the speeded group (M= .48, SE= .03); and the false 
alarm rates were similar between the non-speeded (M= .25, SE= .03) and the speeded 
group (M= .28, SE= .03). There was no significant interaction between task and response 
deadline [F(l, 73)< .43,p= .52, ,,2= .01]. The effect of response deadline had similar 
! 
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effects on the associative reinstatement and object recognition tasks. There was no 
significant interaction between status and task [F(2, 73)< .06,p= .94, ,,2- .00]. The tbree­
way interaction status, task, and response deadline was not significant [F(2, 73)< 1,p= 
.98, ,,2 = .00]. 
The effect of response deadline on the associative reinstatement task 
The next set ofanalyses focused on each recognition memory task individually. 
The results for the Associative Reinstatement Task are displayed in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. The mean proportion of "yes" responses for the four item types in 
the Associative Reinstatement Task of Experiment 2. The dotted bars 
represent false alarms and the error bars reflect standard error. 
To analyze the effect ofresponse deadline on associate reinstatement 
performance, we conducted a 4 (status: old, rearranged, new-background, new) x 2 
1 
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(response deadline: speeded, non-speeded) repeated measures ANOV A. There was a 
main effect of status [F(3, 72)= 57.73,p< .001, r/ .44]. Overall, participants' 
proportions of"yes" responses were highest for old (M= .64, SE= .02), followed by 
rearranged (M= .55, SE= .03 and new-background (M= .50, SE= .03), followed by new I 

items (M= .26, SE= .02). There was a main effect of response deadline [F(l, 73)= 7.08, [ 

p< .05, ,,2= .09]. Overall, the proportion of"yes" responses was higher for the non-

speeded (M= .53, SE= .02) compared to the speeded group (M= .44, SE= .02). There was 

a significant interaction between status and response deadline [F(3, 73)= 4.05,p< .001, 

,,2= .05]. The effect of response deadline differed for the hit and false alarm rates. 

To analyze the interaction between status and response deadline, independent t-
tests were conducted to compare hit and false alarm rates between the speeded and the 
non-speeded groups. The results showed that the hit rate for the old items was 
significantly higher for the non-speeded group (M= .70, SE= .03) than the speeded group 
(M= .57, SE= .04), [t(73)= -2.55,p< .05]. The hit rates for the rearranged items was 
significantly higher for the non-speeded group (M= .60, SE= .04) than the speeded group 
(M= .49, SE= .04), [t(73)= -2.14, p< .05]. The false alarm rate for the new-background 
items was significantly higher in the non-speeded group (M= .58, SE= .03) than the 
speeded group (M= .42, SE= .04), [t(73)= -3.08,p< .05]. There was no significant 
difference in the false alarm rates for the new items between the speeded group (M= .28, 
SE= .03) and the non-speeded group (M= .24, SE= .03), [t(73)= .8l,p= .42]. 
The effect of response deadline on the object recognition task I 
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tThe next set ofanalyses focused on each recognition memory task individually. 
fThe results for the Object Recognition Task are displayed in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. The mean proportion of "yes" responses for the four item types in ( 
t [
the Object Recognition Task of Experiment 2. The dotted bars represent 

false alarms and the error bars reflect standard error. 
 ! 
1 
Similar to Experiment I, to investigate the role of speed on the context effect, we ! 
fconducted a 4 (status: old, rearranged, new-background, new) x 2 (response deadline: ! 
lspeeded, non-speeded) repeated measures ANOVA. There was a main effect of status 
[F(3, 72)= 51.56,p< .001, ,,2= .41] that was qualified by an interaction with response I
speed, [F(3, 72)= 3.07,p< .05, ,,2= .04]. The effect ofresponse deadline differed for the i 
hit and false alann rates. There was a main effect ofresponse deadline [F(l, 73)= 7.55, f 
! 
p< .05, ,,2- .09]. Overall, participants' proportion of "yes" responses was higher in the 
non-speeded (M= .54, SE= .02) compared to speeded group (M= .45, SE= .02). I
,i 
I
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I 
JTo analyze the interaction between status and response deadline, independent t-
tests were conducted to compare the hit and false alarm rates between the speeded and I 
the non-speeded groups for each item status. The hit rate for the old items was 
significantly higher in the non-speeded group (M= .70, SE= .03) and the non-speeded I 
group (M= .56, SE= .04), [t(73)= -2.76, p< .05]. The hit rate for the rearranged items was I 
significantly higher in the non-speeded group (M= .61, SE= .03) and the non-speeded I 
group (M= .47, SE= .04), [t(73)= -2.76,p< .05]. There was no significant difference in 
the hit rate for the new-background items between the speeded group (M= .50, SE= .04) I 
I 
and the non-speeded group (M= .57, SE= .03), [t(73)= ·1.61,p= .11]. There was no i 
fsignificant difference in the false alarm rates between the speeded group (M= .28, SE= t 
l
.03) and the non-speeded group (M= .26, SE= .03), [t(73)= .41,p= .68]. As in Experiment 
I 
; 
f1, the results ofthe two tasks were similar. 
To analyze the effect ofresponse deadline on the magnitude ofcontext effects, we 
computed the increase in object recognition in the old items from the rearranged items 
(hit rate for old items - hit rate for rearranged items) as well as the new-background items I 
(hit rate for old items - hit rate for new-background items). Independent t test showed 1 
that there was no significant difference between in the magnitude ofcontext effects 
between the old and rearranged items for speeded (M= .09, SE= .05) and the non-speeded \ 
group (M= .09, SE= .03), [t(73)= -.03,p= .98]. There was also no significant difference I 
between in the magnitude of the context effects between the old and new-background 
items for speeded (M= .06, SE= .05) and the non-speeded group (M= .14, SE= .03), I 
I 
!. 
[t(73)= -.03,p= .19]. Thus, the size of the context effects did not differ as a function of 
,
response deadline manipulation. 
I 
! 
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Discussion 
The results showed that participants perfonned similarly in both tasks. The 
response deadline did not have an effect on the accuracy perfonnance of the associative 
reinstatement task, nor the size of the context effects in object recognition. 
Associative Reinstatement Task 
Turning to the associative reinstatement results, participants could discriminate 
between old and rearranged object-background pairings. However, they could not 
discriminate between the pairs made up ofunassociated object and background from 
those in which only the object was studied. In other words, participants successfully 
discriminated between pairs made up of two old items (Le., old and rearranged items) 
from pairs made up ofonly one item (Le., new-background items), only for cases in 
which the two old items were specifically paired together (Le., old items). In cases in 
which the two old items were not paired together, discrimination diminished. 
Contrary to our hypothesis, we found the effect ofresponse deadline had mixed 
effects on hit and false alarm rates. Hit rates for old and rearranged pairs were higher in 
the non-speeded group than the speeded group. However, false alarm rate for new-
background, but not for the new items, was also higher in the non-speeded compared to 
the speeded group. Elevated false alarm rate in the new-background items indicated that 
the effect of response deadline might be driven by "yes" response bias for the items in 
which the objects were familiar. Similar to the results of the associative identification 
task in experiment I, accuracy perfonnance did not appear to be especially impeded by a 
response deadline. Cohn and Moscovitch (2007) found that the ability to discriminate 
pairs that made up of two old items from those made up ofonly one item, did not depend 
1 
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on a response deadline and they concluded that the associative reinstatement task was not 
dependent on recollection-based measures. Further, because ofthe elevated false alarm 
rate for the new-background items, our results also suggested that response deadline did 
not have an effect on accuracy performance in the associative reinstatement task. 
Consistent with Cohn and Moscovitch, our results indicated that the associative 
reinstatement task might rely on familiarity and not recollection. 
Indirect context effects were also observed with the associative reinstatement 
results. There was a superior recognition for items that were tested in the presence of 
their paired counterpart, compared to those that were tested in the absence oftheir paired 
counterpart. The results showed that the reinstatement ofthe paired counterpart item 
facilitated recognition for object and background individually, even when task does not 
demand retrieval for the associative information. 
Object Recognition Task 
Similar to Experiment 1, the context effects were observed in the object 
recognition task. The hit rate for the old items (context present) was significantly higher 
than that for the rearranged and the new-background items (context absent). However, 
inconsistent with the results in Experiment 1, we found a main effect ofresponse 
deadline in the object recognition task. The non-speed group recognized more old items 
compared to the speeded group. These findings indicated that the participants might have 
relied on recollection to perform this task. 
Inconsistent with our hypothesis as well as our results in experiment 1, there was 
a main effect ofresponse deadline manipulation in that higher hit rates for old and 
rearranged items were shown in the non-speeded group compared to the speeded group. 
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However, when comparing the magnitudes ofcontext effects between the speeded and I 
l 
I 
non-speeded group, no significant difference was found. This finding matches with our 
i 
results in experiment 1 in that participants relied on the assessment of the objects' 
t 
familiarity while performing this task. I 
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General Discussion 
The binding process and the phenomenon ofcontext effects are also investigated 
outside ofmemory research. For example, context plays an important role in object 
identification, occurring at the initial perception (Oliva & Torralba, 2007). In our visual 
experience, objects do not exist in isolation, but rather within a surrounding context. Our 
knowledge ofobjects and backgrounds derives from our exposure to everyday interaction 
with the environment. Bars (2004) suggested that, when objects appear to be ambiguous 
when presented in isolation, context disambiguates the identity ofobjects. For example, it 
might be easier to identify a toaster when it is presented in a kitchen scene as opposed to 
being presented in a garden. Previous studies found that presentation of context enhanced 
the visual search process in object identification task (e.g., Gordon, 2004; Henderson, J. 
M, 1999). For example, one might be faster at identifying a toaster than a hair dryer in a 
kitchen background scene. Davenport and Potter (2004) found that participants were 
better at identifying objects when they were studied in a consistent and meaningful 
background (e.g., a football player on a field), compared to those presented on an 
inconsistent and incongruous background (e.g., a football player in a chapel). Similarly, 
backgrounds were better identified when presented with congruous objects, compared to 
those presented with incongruous objects. These results indicated that contexts that are 
consistent with our semantic memory play an important role in object identification (but 
see Hollingworth & Henderson, 1998). Castelhand & Henderson (2005) suggested that 
context of an object can be encoded incidentally and facilitate performance in the object 
searching task. Supporting this claim are findings provided by Chun and Jiang (2003), 
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who found that visual search for objects is facilitated by the presence of congruous I 
backgrounds. I 
,I 
The main goal of the current study was to investigate the context effect in ~ I 
recognition memory using object-background association. We compared the performance f 
I 
ofobjection recognition task simultaneously to the associative identification task l 
(Experiment 1), and to the associative reinstatement task (Experiment 2) to examine the I 
contribution of familiarity and recollection in different task demands at retrieval. There J 
I 
are three main implications ofour findings. 
The first implication is with regard to the context effects in item recognition. The 
r 
current research provided clear evidence for the role ofcontext in item recognition. The f 
f 
Irobust context effects were found in both the associative reinstatement (9-10%) and the g
i 
object recognition tasks (5-18%). Neither task required the retrieval for associative ~ 
information, yet the reinstatement of the context facilitated memory for the objects (in the I 
J 
object recognition task) as well as the objects and backgrounds individually (in the 
associative reinstatement task). Smith and Vela (2001) noted that findings on context 
effects in recognition memory were not only inconsistent, but also reported to have I 
fsmaller effect sizes, compared to those in recall memory (e.g., Godden & Baddeley, 
! 
~ 
l1980; Jacoby, 1983; Smith, Glenberg, & Bjork, 1978). In contrast, reliable context effects f 
f 
were observed across both experiments in our paradigm. This finding might be due to the 
fact that we used naturalistic stimuli, unlike previous studies using drawing objects on 
arbitrary backgrounds (e.g., Craik & Schloerscheidt, 2011; Lloyd et al., 2009) or arbitrary 
associations between items and backgrounds (e.g., Sluzenski et al., 2006). Digitalized 
objects and natural backgrounds might be more readily to be perceptually associated I 
1 
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compared to other stimuli that can only be arbitrarily associated (e.g. unrelated word I
•pairs, words on colored backgrounds, two unrelated objects, objects on an arbitrary ~ 
background). Our findings provide support for the claim that the inconsistent reports on 
context effects may reflect the differences in the in the nature of the "context" defined by I 
1 
various studies (McKenzie & Tiberghien, 2004). Variation in the definition of "context" f 
imakes the research in context effects difficult to compare across different studies. 
,
I 
I. 
Findings from both ours and Hayes et at's (2007) study indicated that the role ofcontext 
might be more robust when the nature of the association is more realistic. I 
JOne of the main research questions of the present study concerned whether 
t 
context effects for object recognition were driven by familiarity or recollection. In both I 
experiments, the response deadline manipulation did not have an effect on the magnitude 
of the context effects. The speeded and the non-speeded groups benefited from the ! 
f 
I
reinstatement of the paired background to a similar extent, indicating that the l 
reinstatement of the background primarily aided the assessment of the objects' [ 
tfamiliarity. These results accorded with Craik and Schloerscheidt's (2011) fmdings on f [ 
the context effects observed in older adults, despite of their reduced ability to rely on i 
f
recollection. The current study also provides evidence supporting the ICE (item, context, ~ 
rensemble) theory (Murnane et ai., 1999). This theory argues that the reinstatement of the 
I 
f 
context increases item recognition via increased familiarity strength, without the 
contribution of recollection. 
The second implication of the results of the present study is with regard to I
potential differences in the association between using objects and natural backgrounds 
and using other arbitrary stimuli. Our findings on the associative identification task raised I 
, 
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speculations regarding the nature of the object-background binding at encoding. The 
dual-process theory assumes that item recognition can rely on familiarity, whereas 
associative recognition relies on recollection (Mandler, 1980; Y onelinas, 2002). The 
results of Experiment I contradicted this assumption because the response deadline did 
not impede accuracy perlormance in associative identification task. These results are also 
inconsistent with those ofCohn and Moscovitch's (2007) study, where they found that 
response deadline decreased hit rate for the old items and increased false alarm rate for 
the rearranged items. The inconsistency between our results and Cohn and Moscovitch's 
might be que to the difference in the stimuli used in these studies. Whereas we used 
object and natural background association, Cohn and Moscovitch used unrelated word 
pairs. The inherent naturalistic association between object and background might account 
for the difference in task demands for associative identification task at retrieval. 
Specifically, our findings demonstrated that object and background might have 
been unitized at encoding. Graf and Schacter (1989) defined "unitization" as a process in 
which two or more items are integrated together and encoded as one single •! 
I 
r 
representation. Evidence that unitized association can be supported by familiarity, as 
opposed to recollection, has been reported for word pairs, arbitrary object-background, I 
and word-background associations (Hayes-Roth, 1977; Kelly & Wixted, 2001; I 
Y onelinas, 1999). Our results have demonstrated that response deadline did not impede 
the accuracy performance in the associative identification task, suggesting that the 
retrieval ofobject and natural background associations primarily rely on familiarity. This 
result provided support for the idea ofunitization. In the current findings, we 
demonstrated a familiarity-based associative recognition for object and natural 
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background, because response deadline did not diminish context effects or impair the 
discrimination of old and rearranged pairs. 
An equally important finding was that there was no difference in the hit rates 
between the rearranged and new-background items for the object recognition task in 
Experiment 1 and 2. These results provided evidence that objects and backgrounds might 
not be encoded individually and linked together. Ifobjects and backgrounds were 
encoded individually and arbitrarily associated together, we should have seen an increase 
in the hit rate for the rearranged items from new-background items, because an 
unassociated studied background would have increased familiarity strength for the 
rearranged pairs. That is, context effects did not result from a reinstatement ofany 
studied background, but only in cases for the specific associated background during 
study. This finding also supports our explanation ofobject-background unitization at 
encoding. 
The third implication ofthe present results concerns the strategy that the 
participants might have adopted during the test phase when making recognition decisions. 
The inconsistent results for the object recognition task between two experiments led us to l
speculate that the discrepancy might have resulted from the different natures ofthe tasks j
being performed simultaneously. Cohn and Moscovitch (2007) found that the associative t 
identification task relied on recollection, whereas our results indicated that this task relied 
on familiarity. Banks (2000) has suggested that by switching between two different tasks, I 
tthe participants might base their recognition decision on the same criteria at test phase. In I, 
! 
t 
the associative identification task, if the object and background are unitized, participants ! 
I 
might have treated both tasks as item recognition tasks. In the associative reinstatement 
r 
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task, the participants were asked to respond to the object and the background f 
Iindividually, regardless of their pairing. The nature of this task might have induced a 
strategy in which the participants were likely to separate objects and backgrounds 
individually to perform this task. The negative effect ofresponse deadline on hit rates I 
could be due to the fact that the participants were responding to two items as opposed to 
one. Task switching between the associative reinstatement and the object recognition task 
in Experiment 2 might have also induced a different criterion for recognition memory 
decision than that when performing one type of task throughout the test phase. 
Our findings lead to a number ofempirical questions to be investigated in future 
studies. One is the issue regarding the automaticity ofobject-background binding at 
encoding. In the current research, the participants were instructed to pay attention to the 
objects and the backgrounds for a later memory test. Our paradigm could not directly 
answer whether object and background were bound automatically. If the encoding 
instruction becomes "only pay attention to the objects for a later memory test", will the 
results show (I) discrimination of the old items from the other items in the associative 
identification task, and (2) the context effects in the object recognition and the associative 
reinstatement tasks. If the context effects are found with this encoding instruction, we can 
infer the object-background binding might occur automatically. Furthermore, if the 
encoding instruction involves a deeper level ofprocessing (e.g. should this object cost 
more than $25? - similar to Hayes et al.'s (2007) study), which presumably would 
discourage the participants to pay attention to the background to a greater extent, would 
the same results be found? Hayes and colleagues found that the magnitudes of the context 
effects were similar between the explicit (13%) and implicit (14.7%) encoding instruction 
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groups. Incorporating this manipulation into the current paradigm will further 
I 
! 
f 
demonstrate the automaticity of the object-background binding, should the results reveal 
that the discrimination rates and the context effects are similar, irrespective to the 
encoding instruction. I 
Although we found that the reinstatement of the context facilitated the item f 
recognition across different tasks and experiments, our design could not directly answer 
whether the participants explicitly remembered the backgrounds. In the associative t 
reinstatement task, the responses were similar between the rearranged and the new-
background items in the both speeded and non-speeded groups, which led us to consider I 
the possibility that the participants merely responded to the status of the objects alone and 
not the backgrounds. It is also important to note that the pattern of the proportion of"yes" l 
responses in all three tasks appeared to be similar. These similarities include: (I) highest 
"yes" responses to the old items followed by rearranged and new-background items, (2) 
I 
l 
similar responses to the rearranged and the new-background items, and (3) no difference 
in false alarm rates for the new items. Despite the different memory tasks, the participants ~ 
f 
appeared to respond similarly. One explanation for this is the dominance effect that 
objects might have over backgrounds, in which the participants responded to the objects i 
more attentively than they did to the backgrounds, irrespective of the recognition tasks. 
Related to this idea, Levy et al. (2008) reported that although the participants 
benefit from the reinstatement of the background, they did not have explicit memory for I 
the backgrounds. This explanation may account for the reason we found context effects I 
r(higher recognition for old items than rearranged items), but no difference between the l 
rearranged and the new-background items in the associative reinstatement task. To ) 
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address this question, future research can include the "new-object" item status (i.e., a 
novel object embedded on a studied background). This additional item status will allow 
for the comparison in false alarm rates between the "new-background" items and the 
"new-object" items in the associative reinstatement task, thereby indicating whether the 
backgrounds are explicitly remembered. An alternative method is to modify the current 
paradigm to study context effects on background recognition. A comparison ofhit rates 
for rearranged and new-object items from the current results might provide evidence for 
the object dominance effect. 
Turning to other findings regarding comparison ofmultiple task performance 
across participants, the results in this study were inconsistent with Cohn and 
Moscovitch' s (2007) findings for the associative identification and the associative 
reinstatement task. The design ofthis study only allowed for cross-experiment 
comparison between these two tasks. Future research should compare the associative 
identification and the associative reinstatement tasks in one experiment to further 
investigate the contribution ofthe familiarity and recollection in these two task demands 
at retrieval. 
In conclusion, we want to highlight that object and background might be unitized 
and encoded as one single representation. The current findings combined two lines of 
research in associative recognition and context effects in one paradigm using object-
background associations. Our findings were important regarding the contribution of the 
familiarity and recollection in object-background recognition and object recognition. 
There were several differences between our fmdings and those ofCohn and Moscovitch 
I 
i 
i 
; 
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(2007). These differences are indicative of the variations in associative recognition 
literature due to the various types ofstimuli. 
Previous research in associative recognition memory and context effects have 
used many different types ofstimuli including word pair association (e.g. Castel & Craik, 
2003; Cohn & Moscovitch, 2007; Craik & Schloerscheidt, 2011; Jones & Jacoby, 2001; 
Light & Carter-Sob ell, 1970; Macken, 2002; Markopoulos et al., 2010; McKenzie & 
Tiberghien, 2000; Humphreys, 1976; Tulving & Thomson, 1971), word-background 
association (e.g., Murnane et aI., 1999), object-object association (e.g., Kan et aI., 2011), 
object - natural background association (e.g., Hayes et aI., 2007), face-scene background 
association (e.g., Chua, Hannuala, & Ranganath, 2012; Gruppuso, Lindsey, & Masson, 
2007), face - cued objects association (e.g., Vakil, Raz, & Levy, 2007), face-name 
association (e.g., Chua, Schacter, & Sperling, 2009), animals (e.g., Sluzenski et aI., 2006) 
or objects and arbitrary backgrounds association (e.g. Craik & Schloerscheidt, 2011; 
Lloyd et aI., 2009), simultaneously paired pictures association (Levy et aI., 2008; Park et 
aI., 1987) or temporally paired pictures association (e.g. Schwartz et aI., 2005). Due to 
the variation in the stimuli that have been used to study associative memory, the nature of 
the associations differs vastly in this literature. The variation of stimuli may pose a 
challenge when comparing associative recognition performance across studies due to the 
difference in arbitrary or naturalistic association between two stimuli. 
The literature in context effects, similar to the associative memory research, 
encounters the same challenges. Context is defmed differently across studies, depending 
on the types of associations are being employed. Thus, when examining the role of 
context, researchers should take into account the different types of associations between 
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the stimuli. In the current study, we successfully replicated a robust context effect using 
objects and natural backgrounds association found in Hayes et al. 's study (2007). 
Because these stimuli are more similar to everyday memorial experiences, we hope that 
memory researchers will be willing to continue to investigate differences between natural 
and arbitrary memory effects. 
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